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LIMIZATIONS O'N THE POWER OF ONE PARTNER OVER
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY, WITH PARTICULkR ATTEITTION
TO THE RIGHT TO EXECUTE CHATTEL MORTGAGES.
A Thesis Presented to the School of' Law,
Cornell University 'or the




1 S 9 5.
LII'!_'ATIONS ON THE P-OTER' O OITE PARTiER OVER
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY, "'IT'i PARTICULAR ATTEITTION
TO T'iE RIGHT TO EXECUTE CHATTEL MORTGAGES.
Of all associaticrns by men for carrying on. business-
es, that of a partnership gives to orne -ian, over his as-
sociate the greatest power. According to the tendency
of :nodern decisions, one partner it seems may totally
ruin his co-pIrtner or partkners. Is this right? The
justness of this power as betwe n the members themselves
is not founded on --rinciple, but it see_.s to be a neces-
sary evil for the purpose of protecting third partie5 or
strangers dealing with the fir:i. The doctrine of agency
rinning through the law -f partnershipi requires the bind-
ing of the firm by one meriber.
But notwithstandirng the many po- ers bestowed by a
partnership u_- on the individual members, there is never-
3
theless one thing which all courts agree he can not do,
viz, make an assignment for the benefit of creditors.
All text writers on p:artnership and all courts deny this
right to one partner. Authorities may differ as to
their grourds for such holding, but the denial of the
right is unquestionable. The most popular, and it seems
the most reasonable basis, for holding theft a partner
without the consent of his co-partners, has not the right
to make an assignment for the benefit of creditors, is
one that runs through the very essence of all partnership
agreements, viz, a partnership is not formed to meet with
intentional destruction by one of its members. The
partnership agreement contemplates no such right. The
idea is hostile to all se .se of justness, good faith and
fair dealing. No act or object tending to destroy the
relationship between one partner and his co-partners is,
or ought to be, allowed. It is secession and will be
sanctioned to no greater extent than it wIs in the Civil
War. The principle is the same, and te will layThis
proposition down at the outset that the right of destruc-
tion of partnership relation is not connotedby the tem
partnership. This proposition can be supported by au-
thor i ty.
Now as to the right to lepally execute chattel mort-
gages. The right of' one partner to sell and mortgage
partnership property is recognized and accepted by all
authorities on the subject of partnership. But this is
only a general rule and like every rule has its excep-
tions and limitations. Common sense and reason demand
it. Call in any merchant within the limits of' the city
of New York or Cincinnati, arid ask him whether he unrAer-
stands that his partner has the right to sell him out, or
sell out the business, or even mortgage it as an entirety
without consulting him, and see if' he would not consider
such an act traitorous as well as unlawful and illegal.
And if such be the consensus of' opinion of' merchants how
came the opposite doctrine to have any support or founda-
tion, for there seems to be found numernus dicta, and ex-
pressions in. the adjudicated cases, arid perhaps a case to
support this anomalous, untenable proposition. Vide
Mabbett v. White 12 N.Y. 443. The reason is that cer-
t
tamn powers alloweihe partner, have been carried too far,
and have been given a wider range of applicability by the
law writers than their original scope and intent author-
ize. One partner having as much right and title to
firm property as well as his co-partner, it was thought
that this power could be extended without limit. But
how foolish. This power is unlimited as long as exer-
cisedin behalf of partnership business, to enhance its
interests, to preserve the partnership. But to carry it
further a~.d allow the use of' this pcower as a cloak or an
instrument of destruction, and thus tear down the part-
nership structure, is unjust, and the exercise of' the
power should be checked. The power exists and ceases
only when it is attempted to be exercised with the intent
or for the purpose or object of destyoying or terminating
the partnership, or even as a preliminary step to such
destruction or termination. It narrows down to this
simple quest ian. Was the act of the partner one intend-
ed for the flirther preservation of' the partnership, in
order that it might live, or was it one tending toward
the destruetion of' the partnership? If the former, and
even if it did happen to destroy the business, the exer-
cise of the power was just and should be upheld. But if
it was the latter, then i ll reason, justice and morality
demand the cessation of the rower. it will not be hard
to determine which of' these two motives was present in
the mind of the partner. Was his act one which was
necessary to meet current or existing obligations, or to
nip in the bud some act or proceeding which threatened
the life of the partnership, or jeopardized its further
existelice, or tended to destroy its credit or reputation?
If so, the power existed and should be and will be up-
held. An agent can not act without the scope of this
authority, can not act beyond the apparent power bestowed
by his principal upon him. A partner is an agent.
Certain l.owers are given him by his principal, he must
not go beyond this power given him. And will any one
for a mo:.ent say that a principal ever gives his agent
the right to desttoy his business? A man would rather
kill himself than give some one else the power to do it.
We have been unable to find a single case, with the ex-
ception of the !Mab-)ett v. White case and that is not flat
footed to support the unlimited exercise of the power to
sell and mortgage firm property. Many cases apparen~tly
uphold this proposition but upon closer exaiination it
will be found that there were some extenuating circum-
stances suich as the ratifi-)tio, r acquiesce:Ice of the
absent, or non-concurring partner, or that a majority of
the partners united in the exercise of this power.
Now to discuss the case of' Mabbett v. White 12 N.Y.
443. This case is the only one which seems to supDort
the unlimited exercise of' this power, and hold that one
partner may sell the entire stock of' co-partnership prop-
erty without the consent of his partner. The decision
in this case is clearly against the point we are raising,
but the decision was reached through errors of the Judges
in following what they supposed other cases have held or
decided, when in fact such cases did not, nor did they
intendto lay down the rule so broadly as the Judges in
the Mabbett v. White case evidently thought they did.
In fine, the Judges in this case drew their conclusions
from a misinterpretation of' former decisions. But in
this case as in many others the dissiating opinion is
often the best. it is just here where the distinction
between "law" and"the law" comes in. If there was no
difference between the two terms we are inevitably drawn
to the conclusion that judges are infallible interpreters
of law. Many a decision has been handed down which be-
comes the law of the State or Nation but to say that it
is law is wrong. Thus in this case of Mabbett v. White
the decision of' the majority of' the judges on the point
in question is the law, but we think that there is more
law in the dissenting opinion of' Chief' Justice Denilo, the
brains of' that court. The decision is the law, the dis-
senting opinion is law. This opinion of' Chief Justice
Denio is a vigorous and unanswerable opinion and is so
clearly in point as to our contention, that we can not
refrain from incorporating to some length. He says, "I
am aware that the authority of' each of' the several part-
ners as the agent of the firm is very great. It extends
to all the goods of' the firm, and warrants sales, mort-
gages, and pledges, and every variety of transactions in-
cidelit to the business in which they are engaged. But
it is not wholly without limitation. it must necessar-
ily be confined to the scope and object of the business,
and in the course of its trade af.d affairs. It is no
objection that the tendency and ultimate effect of a
transaction entered into by a partner is disastrous or
even destructive to its business. But this transfer (X
to Mabbett) was made with the deliberate intent and pur-
pose of putting an end to the partnership enterprise, or
wholly subvert its objects, and such was its effect.
This is apparent not only from its enbracing every por-
tion of its means to carry on business, but from the fact
that forcible possession was immediately takei. of its
books of account and of' the store in which the business
had been carried on. i have carefully examined the sev-
eral cases upon this question which were cited at the bar
(these were the only cases referred to in the majority of
opinion) and such others as I could meet with, and I
think there is no well considered judgment which would
justify this transfer."
This is certainly a strong and sensible opinion, and
one coming from so great a jurist as Justice Denio, should
be given due weight. I-f the courts were to follow his
opinion, they would bring the law to a just positioh and
would thus elliminate all opportunities for unfair deal-
ing on the part of one partner, and give greater security
to all the partners, and greater stability to partnership .
Bates Vol.1 sec. 401. Power of one partner over person-
al property. "Each partner has, by reason of his agency
power to sell any specific part of the ;artnership prop-
erty which is held for the purpose of sale, and make a
valid transfer of the entire title of the firm to it."
Mr. Bates now goes on to say that cases and many of the
dicta seem to apply this rule to chattels of every kind,
whether held by the firma for purposes of sale or not.
Citing Clark v. Rives 33 Mo. 579. But Mr. Bates con-
tinues, "I have no doubt but that the power of sale must
be confined to those things held for sale, and that the
scope of the business does not include the sale of proper-
ty held for thie purposes of business and to make a profit
out of it, and that this is the only true rule. Citing
the steam-boat case of Hewitt v. Sturdevant 4 B. Mon. 453
and Caytar v. Hardy 27 Mo. 536 when one partner attempted
a sale of working oxen which were used in farming, this
sale was held void, also Mussey v. Holt concerning a
lease by one partner of partnership real estate.
Has a partner power to sell the entire partnership
effects? The right to do this is commonly asserted and
backed up by many authorities. We can not see the just-
ness of so broad a proposition. If this proposition now
laid down as follows, we might assent to it." One part-
ner has the disposal of all the personal property of the
firm provided he does not use any of that property upon
which the transaction of the firm business depends, or if
his use of the property was to further the interests of
the partnership." This would 're a reasonable and neces-
sary implication to make. The very essential element of
partnership demands as much power as this, but to carry
it any farther is coritrary to the law of partnership, or
to what is necessary for carrying a business by such an
association as a partnership is. Thus in Halstead v.
Shepherd 23 Ala. 558, particularly on p. 573, Gibbons J.
expressly says "olte partr.er acting within the scope of
the ordinary business of the firm, has the right to sell
and dispose of the property of the firm to the extent of
the entire stock." Also in Williams v. Barnett 10 Kas.
455, it is held that each member of a partnership has, in
the a1bsence of stipulations to the contrary the right to
dispose of all partnership property, but that right is
subordinate to the obligation toake all dispositions for
the benefit of the partnership.
Each partner has the power to do, within the scope
of the business, what all unitedly might do, but where
the transaction is unusually large and should excite sus-
picion, if malafide it would not bind the other partners.
Stegal v. Con~ey and Rice 49 Miss. 761. A forced sale by
one partner of the firm property, not in the course of
its business, and of a nature to break it up, confers no
title on the purchaser who buys with notice of the whole
nature of the transaction. Waliace v. Yeager 4 Phila.
251. In Drake v. Thyng 37 Ark. 228 where the partner-
ship was engaged in the brick making industry, and one
partner sold out the whole concern, it was held that the
purchaser would be a trustee for the other partner.
That although selling was part of the firm business, only
that which was held for sale could be sold, and not the
business itself, or the effects necessary for the carry-
ing it on. Alo in this c~n>ection see Myers v. Moulton
12 Pac. 505, ont. Cayton v. Hardy 27 Mo. 536 (referred to
above), Crossman v. Shears 3 Ont. app. 583, Blaker v.
Sands 29 Kas. 551. Shellito v. Sampson 61 Ia. 40, Hunter
v. Maywick 67 Ia. 555. Henderson v. Nicholas 67 Cala.
152. Some of these cases will probably be referred to
later in the discussion of the right of one partner to
execute chattel mortgages on firm property without the
consent of his c&-partner or partners. Bates I. 405.
"The power to sell even property held for sale must be
exercised in the course of the business; hence if the
dissent of a co-partner in a firm of only two is known to^
buyer, the power is revoked." Dickinson v. Legare 1
Desaus. 537, cited.
Having discussed now to some length the general pow-
ers of and limitations upon partners with respect to their
right to sell partnership property, let us revert now to
the main subject of this paper, viz.- the right of one
partner, without the consent of his co-partner, to leg-
ally execute chattel mortgages upon all the firm proper-
ty, and thereby cause a dissolution and destruction of
the partnership. We have already referred to the excep-
tional case of Mabbitt v. White and the dissenting opin-
ion of Chief Justice Denio. Let us see what Bates, who
is the latest and probably the best writer on the subject
o0artnership has to say with reference to this particu-
lar point. "A partner has power to mortgage the whole
stock, subject to the same limitations, doubtless, as in
selling the whole." Many cases hold&ng that there are
no limitations on this right car. be found. There is a
case now pending before the Supreme Court of Ohio and it
was because of the unreasonable holding of the lower
Courts, as it seems to the writer, that he became first
interested in this point. The case is styled Cowen v.
McGrath. Mrs. Cowen was a widow woman who had been left
by a deceased husband his share in the shoe firm of Cowen
and >cGrath. After Mr. Cowen's death, the firm still
continued to do business under the old style and had been
doing business at the time of the suit for several years.
McGrath was an unmitigated raiscal and did about as he
pleased with the business regardless of Mrs. Cowen's pro-
test. McGrath wished to make an assignment for the ben-
efit of creditors; Mrs. Cowen objected and said the firm
could continu1e to do business if properly managed. Mc-
Grath now filed a petition for the dissolution of the
partnership and the appointment of a Receiver. Simul-
taneously with the filing he, without the consent of
Mrs. Cowen, and knowing that she would object, then exe-
cuted chattel mortgages upon All the tangible firm pro-
perty consisting of merchandise a.d store fixtures, to
secure debts now yet due. In a suit to set aside these
mortgages, the Common Pleas Court decided against Mrs.
Cowen, The case is now before the circuit court and wil 1
be taken before the SupreMe Court by which ever side los-
es.
By this case and many others we can see that the
right of one partner to act in certain matters against
the wish and consent of his co-partner, is not at all a
settled question. It seems to be a great hiardship to an
honest partner to be placed at the mercy of a dishonest
and unscrupulous -co-partner. The right to allow one
partner to so act as to destroy the firm, and do it in-
tentionally is certainly not a just one. We fi~d also
many authorities to support our claim that a partner has
no such right. Besides Bates, Collyer on Partnership
Section 179 holds with us.
As to cases we will first mention 6hat of Osborne v.
Barge 29 Fed. Rep. 725. This is one of the latest au-
thorities, and squarely supports our position as regards
the invalidity of chattel mortgage of firm property made
by one partner without the consett of his co-partner.
This ca.se being so strongly in favor of' our position that
we will cite at length from it. Shiras J. gives the
opinion "If a mortgage," says Judge Shiras, "is given up-
on the stock in trade of a partnership and under such
circimstances that the giving thereof practically termin-
ates the business of' the firm, no reason is perceived why
the assent of both partners is not as essential to give
validity to such an instrument, as in the case of a gener-
al assignment. The mortgage executed th complainants
covered practically all the stock of" the firm, came due
twenty-four hours after ths date, and gave the mortgagees
full power to take immediate possession of' the property,
and sell the same for the payment of the mortgage debt.
The practical effect therefore of the instrument, if en-
forced, would terminate the business of' the firm, and to
hand over the control and right of the disposition of the
partnership property to a third person. The right to
thus destroy the life and business of the firm is not
possessed by one of the partners, and to be valid it must
appear that such an instrument was executed by the author-
ity of' all the partners."
In another part of the dpinion Judge Shiras lays
down the general rule on the question with its limitationS
and opinions. "As a general rule it is held that each
member of an ordinary partnership has authority as agent
of the firm to do such acts as are necessary or usual in
the transaction of business in the ordinary way; but that,
as to acts not in the furtherance of the business in the
ordinary way, but which may put ar. erd to the same, or
the naturl result of which is to take the control and
f
ianagement othe firm business ard property from the part-
ners, it is necessary to sustain the validity of such
acts, that it appear that the same were done with the
assent of all the partners." Thus we can see the watch
word is preservation and not destruction. In looking
over the authorities, on both sides of this nice question
we find a late case which from the syllabus would seem
to be in point against us. I refer to the Union Nation-
al Bank case in 136 U. S. 225. But upon closer examina-
tion of the case we do not find that the two cases of
Osborne v. Barge and the Union National Bank case are at
all inconsisten1t. One is based to some great extent up-
on the Statute on this question in Missouri. Besides
the case of Osborne Y. Barge, we find numerous others
that wholly or partly sustain our position. Some we
will quote from in substance. Blaker v. Sands 29 Kan.
551. Here was a partnership existing fnr the purpose of
sheep breeding and raising, intending to sell only the
fleeces of the sheep. One partner attempted to dispose
of the whole flock, but the court held *hat he had no
right to entirely destroy the firm by selling its very
essential elements necessary for its existence.
Hunter v. Mvayvick 37 Ia. 565. in this case there
was a partnership formed for retail grocery business, and
one partner attempted to sell the whole p&ant. The
court held that he had no such right notwithstanding the
fact that his co-partner was seventy-five miles away, but
the court said that in as much as there was a daily mail
between the two cities and a telegraph, he should have
consulted his co-partner. Now these cases are all exam-
ples of a partner selling firm property. But where is
the difference between selling and mortgaging where pos-
session is given practically and simultaneously with the
execution and delivery of the mortgages to the mortgageese
Outside of' the before mentioned case of' Mabbett v. White
which we claim to be erroneously decided, all cases lead
irresistibly to the conclusion that there is no differ-
ence between selling the en1tire partnership property and
mortgaging the same, when the latter act terminates, ipsi
facto, the business of the firm. The only differei-ce is
that the mortgagor has an equity of redemption. But
what is an equity of redemption to one who has been
stripped of his last farthing by the very act which bes-
tows upon him this equity? All his available resources
may lie wholly within the partnership, and when that is
gone, he is penniless. Now, we claim is there any dif-
ference between a mortgage on all the firm property, and
an assignment for t:ie benefit of creditors. The latter
is not allowed and the former should not be. Possession
in both cases is lost to the co-partner. The only dif-
ference as we said before is in this naked good for noth-
ing right of redemption. What an invaluable right this
is to one who has nothing. His equity of redemption is
tantalizing, is mere mockery. And the courts which hold
that because of this right of equity of redemption, one
partner may destroy his co-partner, are throwing a straw
to a drowning man. To redeem the mortgage all that is
necessary is to pay the debt, to raise the assigiment,
all that is necessary is to pay the debts. Now where is
the difference as far as the debtor is concerned. Both
tend toward dissolution and when two men enter into a
partnership, does any one suppose that they are entering
with an agreement whereby power is given to one to inten-
tionally destroy? Justice Hoffman in the case of Peter
v. Orser 6 Bosw. 123, says "The power (of one partner) is
justly implied to do everything which tends to aid,
strengthen arid protect. Many of' the leading objects of
a partrership, the augmentation of capital, the combina-
tion of the varied skill of differe.t persons, etc. etc.,
can be attained without the transmission of the whole
authority of the firm to each member, for either the ac-
quisition or disposition of property. In short, what-
ever tends to preserve may well be deemed to be inherent,
and essential, what presupposes or produces dissolution
is not Yierely not Inherent but really repugnant to the
abstract idea of a partner's power. The union of wills
created the relation, the union of' wills seems necessary
to destroy it." Now is the right to execute chattel
mortgages upon all the firm property with the intention
to kill the partnership, as was done in the Owen v. Mc-
Grath and the Nabbett v. White cases inhere-t to the
partnership agreement? Did the partnersk4.- vest each
other by force of the partnership union, with such power?
Does it not undermine the one great object contemplated
in the partnership agreement, "the sacred bond," as gus-
tice Hoffman says, viz the "furtherance f the partner-
ship objects so long as they car; be attained." The de-
livery of possession of the property to the mortgagees
by one partner without the consent of hs co-partner,
is a complete abdication of' his power as a partner, and a
termination of' his implied agency on behalf of his co-
partner.
Thus to corclude, we see that the question before us
is a very close one, the authorities on the subject being
well balanced against each other. The great difficulty
in fixing the law is this. The judges on the one hand
limit the partner's power because they fear a too far en-
croachment upon the partner's power. The very essence
of partnership requires great latitude to be given one
partner and the Courts are cautious about limiting the
exercise of the partnership rights* On #he other hand
the judges see the unjustness and very apparent unfair-
ness done in giving one partner so rauch power and they
thus desire to limit it somewhat without abridging his
general right as a partner.
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